State of Utah v. Richard Norris : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Richard Norris : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jennifer K. Gowans; Fillmore Spencer; Counsel for Petitioner.
Jeffrey S. Gray; E. Neal Gunnarson; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Counsel for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Norris, No. 20040880 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5301
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND 
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JENNIFER K. GO WANS 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 N. University Ave. 
Provo,UT 84604 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON (1273) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
"wWZJf 
^>sm0Uf,Ts 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND 
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JENNIFER K. GO WANS 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 N. University Ave. 
Provo,UT 84604 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON (1273) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 5 
A. THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 6 
B. APPLICATION OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE TO SECTION 76-10-1801 9 
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Falsehoods Made 
Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless Disregard for the Truth 9 
2. The "Anything of Value" Provision Does Not Render the 
Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad 12 
(a) The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and Reckless Falsehoods 
Are Not Protected Is Dispositive 13 
(b) In Any Event, Defendant Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the 
"Anything of Value" Provision Because He Was Not Convicted of 
that Provision 13 
(c) In Any Event, the State May Prohibit Frauds Aimed at Depriving 
Persons of Intangible Rights or Interests 14 
C. DEFENDANT' S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTE IS VAGUE Is OUTSIDE THE 
SCOPE OF THE COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI 16 
i 
CONCLUSION 17 
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 18 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 19 
ARGUMENT 
A CHALLENGE TO THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A 
STATUTE IS A NONJURISDICTIONAL MATTER THAT IS WAIVED 
UPON AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 19 
CONCLUSION 31 
ADDENDUM (Opinion of the Court of Appeals) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
BE &K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 2390 (2002) 10 
Blackledge v. Perry, All U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098 (1974) 24, 25 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969) (per curiam) 14 
Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908 (1973) 6, 8, 9 
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942) 10, 12 
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 
317(1940) 27 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951) 14 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 116 
S.Ct. 2374 (1996) 14 
Doe, 509 U.S 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) 26 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964) 10, 11, 12 
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (1987) 8,11, 12, 15 
Los Angeles Police Dep'tv. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 120 
S.Ct. 483 (1999) 7, 8 
Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) 29 
McConnellv. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003) 8 
McNallyv. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (1987) 15 
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241 (1975) 24, 25 
Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2nd Cir. 1974) 30 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964) 6, 10 
New Yorkv. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (1982) 6, 8, 10 
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (1987) 28, 29 
i i i 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973) 22 
Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919) 12 
United States v. Barboa, 111 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1985) 30 
United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 879, 
117 S.Ct. 204 (1996) 27, 28 
United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995) 30 
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757 (1989) 25, 26, 29 
United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972) 29 
United States v. Dinwiddie, 16 F.3d 913 (%th Cir. 1996) 15 
United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977) 29 
United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996) 30 
United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1996) 30 
United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989) 29 
United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000) 29 
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988) 16 
United States v. Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d 557 (11th Cir. 1995) 29 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994) 29 
United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1977) 29 
United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999) 14 
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 538 U.S. 
1065, 123 S.Ct. 2234 (2003) 29 
United States v. Winter, 509F.2d975 (5th Cir. 1975) 29 
Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, AAA U.S. 620, 100 
S.Ct. 826, 836 (1980) 15 
iv 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976) 10 
STATE CASES 
Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864 (1984) 29 
Barnardv. Wassermann, 855P.2d243 (Utah 1993) 20 
Beaver County v. Quest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 1147 18 
Castle Valley Special Service District v. Utah Board of Oil, 938 P.2d 248 
(Utah 1996) 20 
Chenv. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 21 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) 16 
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d283 26 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d211 20, 21, 22 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 86 P.3d 735 passim 
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820 17 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) 1, 18 
State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117,63 P.3d 66 21,23 
State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983) 7, 8 
State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978) 22 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) 24 
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732 passim 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 20 
State v. Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 2004) 27 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989) 17 
v 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
18U.S.C. 1346(1988) 16 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (West 2004) .passim 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (West 2004) 1,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (West 2004) 21, 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002) 22, 23 
vi 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals from 
its decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is the Utah communications fraud statute overbroad under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196,1199 (Utah 1995). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 5, 86 P.3d 735. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud-Elements—Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications fraud for selling 
advertising to Utah sub-contractors through one Pennsylvania corporation, luring the sub-
contractors into default on their notes through a series of misrepresentations and omissions, 
and then, through another Pennsylvania corporation, obtaining confession judgments in 
Pennsylvania for much more than the originally agreed upon amount. Norris, 2004 UT App 
267,at^[2;R. 1-8,106-12,125-27. The State twice amended the information and defendant 
was tried for five counts of communications fraud. R. 210-14; 750-54. After the State rested 
and in the midst of defendant's case-in-chief, defendant waived his trial rights and entered a 
voluntary and unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud, all third 
degree felonies. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at % 2; See R. 761-72; R. 871-75. The court 
sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years, suspended the 
same, and placed defendant on supervised probation. R. 791-93. 
Defendant timely appealed, claiming that the communications fraud statute was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at *f 2; R. 
797-98. Although defendant had not challenged the constitutionality of the statute at trial, 
had not moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and had entered an unconditional guilty plea, the 
1
 The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to resolution of the 
questions presented for certiorari review. The State does not, therefore, provide a detailed 
statement of those facts. Suffice it to say that defendant created three Pennsylvania 
corporations through which he defrauded R&R Drywall, Durham Plumbing, and Foote 
Insurance of money by means of false or fraudulent pretences, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth. See R. 771 (Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea). 
3 
court of appeals addressed the merits of defendant's claim. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at 12. 
The court held that "a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute... is necessarily a 
jurisdictional matter" that may not be waived by an unconditional guilty plea. Id. at f^ 7. 
After so holding, the court "conclude[d] that the communications fraud statute is neither 
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally vague," and affirmed defendant's 
convictions. Id. at1]} 16. 
Defendant petitioned for certiorari review of the holding that section 76-10-1801 is 
neither facially overbroad, nor vague. The State petitioned for certiorari review of the 
holding that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is jurisdictional. This Court 
granted certiorari review "only as to the following issues": 
1. Whether the Communications Fraud Statute, section 76-10-1801 of the 
Utah Code, is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
2. Whether an unconditional guilty plea waives a defendant's appellate 
challenge to the facial constitutionality of the statute under which the 
defendant was charged. 
Order dated December 22, 2004. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the communications fraud statute is not 
overbroad. The statute prohibits fraud only where the defendant makes false representations 
or material omissions intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that such communications enjoy no First Amendment 
protection. Moreover, defendant lacks standing to challenge the "anything of value" 
provision as overbroad because he was convicted of obtaining "money" through fraudulent 
means. In any event, the "anything of value" provision is not overbroad. 
Defendant's vagueness claim should not be addressed by this Court. The Court did 
not grant certiorari on this issue and it is not fairly included in the question of overbreadth. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
After holding that it had jurisdiction to address defendant's claim,2 the Utah Court of 
Appeals "conclude[d] that the communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face." 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, fflf 7-11. The court observed that the statute does not prohibit all 
falsehoods or material omissions, as argued by defendant, "only those where an individual 
seeks 'to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value.'" 
Id. at 111 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999)). The court also noted that the 
2
 The State challenges this holding in its Brief of Cross-Petitioner, infra, at 18-31. 
5 
statute prohibits only those falsehoods or material omissions that are "'made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code 
Ami. § 76-10-1801(7)). The Court observed that the statute thus "draws the distinction 
between criminal and innocent behavior" with a mens rea consistent with the standard set 
forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964). 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f^ 11. As such, the court concluded, section 76-10-1801 is not 
substantially overbroad and should not be invalidated. Id. 
The court's holding is correct. 
A. THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE. 
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may 
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally 
to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 
S.Ct. 3348,3360 (1982). However, this traditional rule of "standing" has been altered by the 
U.S. Supreme Court "to permit—in the First Amendment area—'attacks on overly broad 
statutes . . . .'" Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973) 
(citation omitted). As recently explained by this Court, the First Amendment exception for 
overly broad statutes "' gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others 
not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant.'" 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^  10, 86 P.3d 735 (quoting State v. Lopez, 935 
P.2d 1259, 1263 n.2 (Utah App. 1997)). 
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The overbreadth doctrine stems from the concern that '"persons whose expression is 
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their right [to free speech] for 
fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected 
expression.9" Los Angeles Police Dep'tv. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38, 
120 S.Ct. 483, 488 (1999) (citation omitted). "Because these individuals are never 
prosecuted, the overbroad statute [would go] unchallenged." Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 11. 
The overbreadth doctrine remedies this "chilling effect" on expression, permitting "a party 
[to] challenge a statute on the basis that it criminalizes protected speech even though that 
party's own conduct or speech is not constitutionally protected." Id. 
On the other hand, the overbreadth doctrine does not give a defendant standing to 
challenge a statute indiscriminately. As explained in Thompson, an overbreadth claimant 
must satisfy the other requirements for standing. Id. at f 12. "To have standing in the 
context of a facial overbreadth challenge, a party must still demonstrate its own cognizable 
injury in fact." Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). That is, the party must 
demonstrate that the portion of the statute challenged as unconstitutional was applied to him. 
See id. 
The overbreadth doctrine, therefore, cannot be properly relied upon to invalidate a 
portion of a statute under which a defendant has not been charged or convicted: 'When a line 
of excision is available, one standing within the zone which a truncated statute might reach 
may be barred from setting up the statute's overbreadth as to others.'" Id. at f^ 13 (quoting 
State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1983)) (other citations omitted). The defendant 
7 
"may only challenge multiple portions of a statute if invalidating each of the challenged 
portions would be necessary to find that defendant's conduct fell outside the statute's 
proscriptions." Id. at f^ 18. A defendant may not challenge "a statutory provision 
unnecessary to the outcome of the case because it is one that the parties do not have standing 
to litigate." itf. atf 13. 
The overbreadth doctrine "is, manifestly, strong medicine" because it "totally 
forbid[s]" enforcement of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2916-17. As a result, it 
"is not [employed] casually," United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 39, 120 S.Ct. at 489, but 
"sparingly and only as a last resort," Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. "The 
scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established 
principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a 
statute is truly warranted." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. at 3361. 
Because the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, those who challenge a statute as 
overbroad carry a "heavy burden." McConnell v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 540 U.S. 93, 
207,124 S.Ct. 619, 697 (2003). To prevail, an overbreadth claimant must demonstrate that 
"(1) the statute 'reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,' even if 
the statute also has a legitimate application, and (2) the statute is not 'readily subject to a 
narrowing construction.'" Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 11 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (1987), and State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983) 
(other citations omitted)). 
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B. APPLICATION OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE TO SECTION 76-104801. 
Section 76-10-1801 provides: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
[communications fraud]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1). At the outset, therefore, section 76-10-1801 falls within 
those statutes that prohibit "conduct—even if expressive—fall[ing] within the scope of 
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining 
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." See Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. Defendant recognizes as much, conceding that "the 
government has a legitimate interest in deterring and prosecuting fraud." Pet. Brf. at 22. 
"Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown 
extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, 
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute 
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe." Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct, at 
2917-18. Such is the case with section 76-10-1801. Indeed, a review of the statute reveals 
that there is no overbreadth. 
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Falsehoods Made 
Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless Disregard for the Truth. 
The paramount question here is whether the communications fraud statute can 
"conceivably be applied" to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct or expression. See 
9 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767, 102 S.Ct. at 3360. It cannot, for it prohibits only those falsehoods 
or material omissions that are "made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). Such falsehoods enjoy no First 
Amendment protection. 
The First Amendment affords a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order 
to provide the breathing space necessary for the exercise of fully protected speech, or 
"speech that matters:' BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S.Ct. 
2390,2399 (2002) (quoting Gertzv. Robert Welsh, The.,418U.S. 323,341-42,94 S.Ct.2997 
(1974)) (emphasis added in BE & K). Nevertheless, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or 
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976). 
As a result, certain classes of speech "ha[ve] never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem." Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766,769 
(1942). Falsehoods uttered intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for their 
truth fall within one of those unprotected classes. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216 (1964). 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not 
permit civil recovery for a defamatory falsehood unless "the [false] statement was made with 
'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. The court of appeals here 
concluded that because the mens rea requirement for communications fraud is consistent 
10 
with that required under New York Times, the statute "cannot be said [to be] 'substantially 
overbroad.'" Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S.Ct. 
2502). Defendant challenges this conclusion, arguing that the New York Times mens rea 
standard "is clearly limited to its civil context and has no bearing on the constitutionality of a 
criminal statute that proscribes speech, including § 76-10-1801." Pet. Brf. at 20. 
Defendant's argument is wrong. 
In Garrison v. Louisiana—issued the same year as New York Times—the U.S 
Supreme addressed whether the New York Times mens rea standard for civil libel cases also 
applies in the criminal context. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S.Ct. at 212. It concluded that 
it does. Id. Garrison recognized that "even where [an] utterance is false, the great principles 
of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching 
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless'' Id. at 73, 85 S.Ct. at 215 
(emphasis added). The Court concluded that the reasons which led to the knowing or 
reckless requirement in New York Times "apply with no less force merely because the 
remedy is criminal." Id. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 215-16. The Court thus held that "[t]he 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the same standard 
to the criminal remedy." Id. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 216. 
Although Garrison involved a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court's analysis 
made clear that knowing or reckless falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection, 
whatever the context. The Court recognized that an inaccurate but honest utterance 
contributes to the "fruitful exercise of the right of free speech." Id. at 75, 85 S.Ct. at 216. 
11 
On the other hand, calculated falsehoods "put a different cast on the constitutional question" 
because such falsehoods are "at once at odds with the premises of democratic government 
and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected." 
Id. The Court thus concluded that "[calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances 
which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.'" Id. (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572,62 S.Ct. at 
769). "Hence," the Court held, "the knowingly false statement and the false statement made 
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection" Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Garrison is controlling. As observed by the Court of Appeals, Norris, 2004 UT App 
267, If 11, the communications fraud statute imposes criminal sanctions only where the 
falsehoods are made "intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). Garrison held that such speech enjoys no First 
Amendment protections. Accordingly, and regardless of any additional element that may 
define or limit the offense, "it cannot be said that [the communications statute] is 
'substantially overbroad' . . . ." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^ 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 
458, 107 S.Ct. 2502). 
2. The "Anything of Value" Provision Does Not Render the 
Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad. 
Relying on Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), defendant 
nevertheless claims that the communications fraud statute is overbroad because it requires no 
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"clear and present danger" or "harm." Pet. Brf. at 20-30. Specifically, he argues that 
because the object of the fraud can be "anything of value," the "spectrum of constitutionally 
protected communications . . . is only as broad as the imagination" and thus encompasses 
fraudulent schemes that create no clear and present danger or harm. Pet. Brf. at 30. He 
argues, for example, that the statute prohibits a knowing or reckless falsehood made to 
preserve a good grade, Pet. Brf. at 18 (by claiming that "[t]he dog ate my homework"), to 
receive a kiss, Pet. Brf. at 18, (by saying, "You don't look fat in that dress"), to avoid an 
unwanted outcome, Pet. Brf. at 18-19 (e.g., an arrest), to obtain votes, Pet. Brf. at 28-29 (by 
misrepresenting position on abortion), or to create a public controversy, Pet. Brf. at 28-29 (as 
in an editorial). This claim fails on several levels. 
(a) The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and Reckless Falsehoods 
Are Not Protected Is Dispositive. 
As noted, falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly are not protected, 
whatever the object of the fraud. It is therefore irrelevant how the statute limits the object of 
the fraud. Whether or not the object of the fraud is a kiss, a vote, avoiding arrest, or some 
other thing of arguable value is irrelevant because, in any case, the intentional, knowing, or 
reckless falsehood is not protected. Defendant's challenge to the "anything of value" 
provision thus fails. 
(b) In Any Event, Defendant Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the 
"Anything of Value" Provision Because He Was Not Convicted of 
that Provision. 
In any event, defendant does not have standing to challenge the "anything of value" 
provision of the statute. Defendant pled guilty to three counts of communications fraud 
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based on evidence at the trial establishing that he executed a fraudulent scheme to obtain 
money, in excess of an originally agreed amount, from R&R Drywall, Durham Plumbing, 
and Foote Insurance. See R. 771, 768. Accordingly, defendant was convicted under the 
provision of the statute sanctioning a fraudulent scheme "to obtain from another money," not 
"anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). As explained by this Court in 
Thompson, a defendant does not have standing to challenge a provision of the statute which 
was not applied to the defendant. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, YH12-13,18. This Court should 
not therefore address defendant's challenge to the "anything of value" provision. 
(c) In Any Event, the State May Prohibit Frauds Aimed at Depriving 
Persons of Intangible Rights or Interests. 
Even if this Court were to address defendant's claim, it fails on the merits for two 
reasons. 
First, defendant's reliance on Schenk and its progeny, including Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494,71 S.Ct. 857 (1951), is misplaced. The "clear and present danger" test 
articulated in Schenck and Dennis has evolved into the Brandenburg "incitement" test.3 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm, Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778, 116 S.Ct. 2374 
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring)); United States v. Vieflaaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1999). And that test only applies to laws that forbid the advocacy of violence or the 
3
 Under the rule articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 
1827,1830 (1969) (per curiam), "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action." 
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violation of law. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S at 447, 89 S.Ct. at 1830; United States v. 
Dinwiddle, 16 F.3d 913, 922 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996). The communications fraud statute is not 
such a law. 
Second, defendant's claim that the crime of fraud must be limited to money or 
property is not supported by case law. "[T]he common law criminalized frauds beyond those 
involving 'tangible rights' and 'the crime of fraud has often included deceptive seduction, 
although that crime often includes no property or monetary loss.'" McNally v. United States, 
483 U.S. 350, 371, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2887-88 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that "[fraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited" and 
that penal laws can be enacted "to punish such conduct directly." Village ofSchaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, AAA U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836 (1980). This 
power is not limited to those frauds involving money or property. 
In McNally, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the federal mail fraud statute was 
limited to those frauds aimed at causing deprivation of property or money; it did not include 
fraudulent schemes designed to deprive persons of intangible rights or interests, as in the 
right to have public officials perform their duties honestly. Id. at 358-60,107 S.Ct. at 2881-
82. This conclusion, however, was based on the Court's reading of the statute, not on any 
constitutional limitation. Indeed, the Court invited Congress to amend the law if it wished to 
expand mail fraud to those schemes involving intangible rights or interests. Id. at 360,107 
S.Ct. at 2882 (acknowledging that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more 
clearly than it has" in the current statute). Congress did so the following year. 18 U.S.C. 
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1346 (1988) (providing that "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services"). 
C. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTE IS VAGUE IS OUTSIDE THE 
SCOPE OF THE COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI. 
Defendant also contends that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally 
vague. Pet. Brf. at 31-39. The State does not address this claim because the Court did not 
grant certiorari on this issue. 
The law is well-settled that this Court will review on certiorari"' [o]nly the questions 
set forth in the petition or fairly included therein' and for which certiorari is granted." DeBry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). Although 
defendant petitioned for review of the holdings on both vagueness and overbreadth, this 
Court did not grant certiorari on the vagueness issue. See Order dated December 22, 2004 
(granting defendant's petition for certiorari "only as to . . . [wjhether the Communications 
Fraud Statute, section 76-10-1801 of the Utah Code, is unconstitutionally overbroad"). 
Defendant is thus precluded from raising vagueness on certiorari. 
Moreover, vagueness is not fairly included in the issue of overbreadth. "While 
admittedly vagueness and overbreadth are related constitutional concepts, they are separate 
and distinct doctrines, subject in application to different standards and intended to achieve 
different purposes." United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988). The 
overbreadth doctrine is a First Amendment exception to the traditional rule of standing, 
permitting a defendant to challenge a statute that infringes on First Amendment freedoms 
"'even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant.'" Provo City Corp. v. 
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Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^  10, 86 P.3d 735 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 
1263 n. 2 (Utah App. 1997)). On the other hand, "'vagueness questions are essentially 
procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed 
conduct.'55 State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Morrison, 2001 
UT 73, Tj 13,31 P.3d 547). Thus, while statutes are frequently challenged as both overbroad 
and vague, the issue of vagueness is not fairly included within the issue of overbreadth.4 
This Court should not, therefore, address defendant's vagueness claim because it is 
outside the scope of certiorari—the Court did not grant certiorari on defendant's vagueness 
claim and vagueness is not fairly included in the question of overbreadth. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals on the issue of constitutional overbreadth. 
4
 In any event, there is nothing vague about the terms "communicate," "artifice," or 
"anything of value." Each term has a commonly understood meaning. Moreover, the fact 
that they may encompass a wide range of activity does not render them vague. See State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (holding that "a statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague because it is broad"). 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20040880-SC 
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
is & * 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE5 
Is a challenge to the constitutionality of a presumptively valid statute a jurisdictional 
matter that may not be waived by an unconditional guilty plea? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199. "In 
doing so, th[e] Court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of appeals: 
questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are 
reversed only if clearly erroneous." Id. "The determination of whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law" reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Quest, 
Inc., 2001 UT 81, *{ 8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
5
 For a Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement of the Case, and relevant Constitutional 
Provisions. Statutes, and Rules, see Brief of Respondent, supra, at 1-5. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals incorrectly concluded that a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived by a guilty plea. 
A court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case if it is one of the types of cases the court 
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute. The district court has original 
jurisdiction of criminal cases. Section 76-10-1801 makes it a crime to commit 
communications fraud. The statute is presumptively valid; no court has deemed it 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, a case brought by the State charging defendant with violating 
the communications fraud statute is a case the district court has been empowered to entertain. 
The cases cited by the court of appeals do not support its holding. Moreover, a rule that 
permits a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a statute notwithstanding a guilty plea 
disrupts the finality of a judgment. Where defendant could make that claim in a pre-trial 
motion, he should be required to do so. 
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ARGUMENT 
A CHALLENGE TO THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A 
STATUTE IS A NONJURISDICTIONAL MATTER THAT IS WAIVED 
UPON AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
The majority of the court of appeals held that "an unconditional guilty plea does not 
operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, because such a challenge 
is jurisdictional in nature." State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, % 7, 97 P.3d 732. This Court 
should reverse. 
"The general rule applicable in criminal cases, and the cases are legion, is that by 
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the 
crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989). On the other 
hand, "challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be 
waived." Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243,248 (Utah 1993). The question before the 
Court here is whether the constitutionality of a statute goes to the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the district court. It does not. Therefore, defendant waived that claim. 
"'A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the 
court has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court 
derives its authority.5" Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 16, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting In re Estate 
of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah App. 1988)). In other words, "[sjubject matter 
jurisdiction ... goes to the competence of a body to resolve a certain dispute." Castle Valley 
Special Service District v. Utah Board of Oil, 938 P.2d 248, 254 (Utah 1996) (emphasis 
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added). A challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a "challenge [to] the authority 
of the court to hear the underlying case." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 38, 100 P.3d 1177. 
The district court had the authority to hear the State's criminal case against defendant. 
District court jurisdiction is defined by section 78-3-4 of the Utah Code: "The district 
court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (West 2004). The 
import of this language is clear: the district court has jurisdiction over proceedings against a 
person who has been charged with a crime unless some other provision prohibits such 
jurisdiction. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, ^ j 7, 63 P.3d 66 (holding that the import of 
section 78-3-4 "is clear; specifically, the district court has jurisdiction over proceedings 
against a person twenty-one years of age or older who has been charged with crimes he 
allegedly committed when he was under eighteen years of age, unless some other provision 
prohibits such jurisdiction"). 
Section 76-10-1801 makes it a felony crime to commit communications fraud. See 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1999). Accordingly, a criminal case charging defendant with 
communications fraud "'is one of the type of cases the [district] court has been empowered 
to entertain'" by section 78-3-4. Myers, 2004 UT 31, H 16 (quotingMcLaughlin, 754 P.2d at 
682). Whether or not section 76-10-1801 is subsequently found unconstitutional, a case 
charging a person with violating that section is a criminal case, which the district court "'has 
been empowered to entertain.'" Id. No other provision prohibits such jurisdiction. 
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Accordingly, the majority below erred in concluding that a challenge to the constitutionality 
of section 76-10-1801 goes to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
This Court has treated challenges to the constitutionality of a statute as 
nonjurisdictional, finding them waived if not raised in the trial court below. 
In Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the defendant entered an unconditional 
guilty plea to one count of aggravated murder for the stabbing death of his former girlfriend 
and her unborn child. Id. at \ 6. Myers did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he 
seek a direct appeal. Id. In a petition for post-conviction relief, he claimed that the 
aggravated murder statute was either insufficiently clear or wholly unconstitutional. Id. at ^ j 
14. Although his claim was raised at trial and thus procedurally barred under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002), Myers contended that he 
was not barred from raising his claim in a post-conviction proceeding because "the alleged 
defects in the aggravated murder statute divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the 
matter." Id. at [^ 15. Myers argued that "because the aggravated murder statute is either 
insufficiently clear under [State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978)], or wholly 
unconstitutionalunder [Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S.Ct. 705 (1973)], the statute cannot 
be the basis for criminalizing the killing of a nonviable fetus." Id. (emphasis added). 
This Court rejected Myers's jurisdictional claim. The Court observed that"' [a] court 
has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court has been 
empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court derives its 
authority.'" Id. at \ 16 (quoting McLaughlin, 754 P.2d at 681-82) (citing Restatement 
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(Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)). The Court also acknowledged that jurisdictional claims 
may not be waived. Id. However, the Court concluded that Myers had "failed to state any 
legitimate jurisdictional defect" because as a "criminal case/' the aggravated murder 
prosecution was "certainly the type of case over which the trial court generally has 
jurisdiction." Id. The Court so concluded notwithstanding Myers' claim that the statute was 
"wholly unconstitutional" under Roe. 
In State v. Hodges, the State charged the twenty-one-year-old defendant in district 
court with six first degree felony crimes for sexually abusing a child when Hodges was under 
eighteen. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, \ 2. Hodges argued that Utah law vested jurisdiction with 
the juvenile court in such cases, not the district court. Id. at f^ 4. Alternatively, Hodges 
argued that if Utah statutes vest jurisdiction with the district court, "then the statutory 
scheme is unconstitutional" under both the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution. Id. at j^ 5. The Court rejected Hodge's first argument, concluding that the 
district court had jurisdiction over his case under Utah's statutory scheme. Id. at ffl[ 7-16. 
Although Hodges claimed that the statutory scheme, as interpreted by the Court, was 
unconstitutional, the Court refused to address the claim because Hodges did not raise it 
below. 
[Hodges] raises his constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal. "The 
general rule is that issues not raised [in the district court] cannot be argued for 
the first time on appeal, and this rule applies to constitutional questions." 
Because defendant has not asserted either of the exceptions to the general 
rule—plain error or exceptional circumstances—we decline to address 
defendant's constitutional issues. 
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Id. at 15 (quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994) (other internal citations 
omitted)) (brackets supplied in Hodges). In other words, the Court did not treat his claim 
that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional as jurisdictional in nature. Accordingly, 
Hodges waived the claim when he failed to raise it in the trial court. 
This Court should follow the precedent set in Myers and Hodges. 
The majority cites Blackledge v. Perry, All U.S. 21,30-31,94 S.Ct. 2098 (1974), and 
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 241 (1975), in support of its holding that 
the facial constitutionality of a statute is jurisdictional in nature. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 
Tf 6. Blackledge and Menna do not support the majority's holding. 
In Blackledge, the defendant (Perry) was tried and convicted of misdemeanor assault 
in connection with an altercation with a fellow inmate. Blackledge, All U.S. at 22,94 S.Ct. 
at 2099. When Perry appealed, giving him a right to a trial de novo, the prosecution obtained 
a felony indictment from a grand jury based on the same conduct for which Perry had been 
convicted on the misdemeanor charge. Id. at 22-23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100. Perry pled guilty and 
was sentenced to prison. Id. Perry thereafter filed a federal habeas petition seeking reversal 
of his felony conviction. Id. at 23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100. 
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court recognized that Perry's guilty plea 
normally would preclude him from raising a constitutional challenge on federal habeas. Id. 
at 29-30, 94 S.Ct. at 2103. The Court observed, however, that the Due Process Clause 
"preclude[s]" a state from responding to a defendant's invocation of his statutory right to 
appeal "by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to [completion of the appeal]." 
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Id. at 28-30,94 S.Ct. at 2103-04. The Court held that because such vindictive prosecutions 
go "to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him/9 the defendant could challenge it for the first time on federal habeas. 
Id. at 30-32, 94 S.Ct. at 2103-04. In other words, the State "simply could not permissibly 
require Perry to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 31, 94 S.Ct. at 2104. 
In Menna, the defendant was held in contempt and sentenced to 30 days in jail for 
refusing to testify before a grand jury. Menna, 423 U.S. at 61,96 S.Ct. at 241. Menna was 
subsequently indicted on a criminal charge for refusing to answer questions before the grand 
jury and he pled guilty. Id. Menna appealed, "claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precluded the State from hailing him into court on the charge to which he had pleaded 
guilty." Id. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 242. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[w]here the 
State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a 
charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the 
conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty." Id. (quoting Blackledge, 417 
U.S. at 30, 94 S.Ct. at 2103). 
In sum, Blackledge and Menna address "the very power of the State to bring the 
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him." Blackledge, 417 U. S. at 3 0, 
94 S.Ct. at 2103. In each case, the Constitution "preclude[s]" the State from "hal[ing a 
defendant] into court at all upon [a] felony charge." Id. at 30, 94 S.Ct. at 2104; Menna, 423 
U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. at 242; accord United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct 757 
(1989). 
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While double jeopardy and due process precludes a State from twice haling a 
defendant into court on the same charges, nothing in the Constitution precludes the State in 
the first instance from haling a defendant into court for violating a law duly enacted by the 
Legislature. As recently observed by this Court, and echoed in Judge Bench's dissent, 
"[sjtatutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown." Jones v. 
Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^  10, 94 P.3d 283; accord Norris, 2004 UT App 
267, f 27 (Bench, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones). The United States Supreme Court has 
likewise recognized that "[a] statute is presumed constitutional." Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 
U.S 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993). "Thus, because the communications fraud 
statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to be constitutional, and the district court 
had jurisdiction." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 27 (Bench, J., dissenting).6 
As held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Broce, "[b]y entering a plea of guilty, the 
accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is 
admitting guilt ofa substantive crime" Broce, 488 U.S. at 570,109 S.Ct. at 762 (emphasis 
added). In other words, he concedes the validity of the criminal statute. 
Just last year, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue now before the court 
and held that "a facial challenge to a presumptively valid criminal statute does not raise an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution and thus may be waived if not 
6
 Of course, the outcome would be different if the State were to prosecute a defendant 
for violating a law that had previously been invalidated as facially unconstitutional. In that 
case, there would be no presumption of constitutionality and prosecution of the invalidated 
law would then be "prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
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timely asserted." State v. Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69, 84 (Neb. 2004). In so holding, the 
Nebraska court relied on the rationale of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia in United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 879, 
117 S.Ct. 204 (1996). This Court should follow suit. 
In Baucum, the D.C. Circuit held that "facial constitutional challenges to 
presumptively valid statutes [are] nonjurisdictional" and thus can be waived. Id. at 540. The 
court held that "[w]hen a federal court exercises its power under a presumptively valid 
federal statute, it acts within its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 3231" (granting 
federal district courts original jurisdiction of all offenses against federal laws). Id. The court 
acknowledged that "once a statute has been declared unconstitutional, the federal courts 
thereafter have no jurisdiction over alleged violations (since there is no valid 'law of the 
United States' to enforce)... ."Id. at 540-41. However, the court emphasized that "a belated 
assertion of a constitutional defect does not work to divest that court of its original 
jurisdiction to try [a defendant] for a violation of the law at issue." Id. at 541. 
The majority's opinion in this case is premised on a theory that if a criminal statute is 
deemed unconstitutional, it is void and any action taken pursuant to that statute is invalid. 
See Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 7. Baucum, however, rejected such a "broad-sweeping 
proposition." Baucum, 80 F.3d at 541. Baucum observed that in Chicot County Drainage 
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that "a district court enjoyed res judicata effect even after the jurisdictional statute 
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under which the court had acted was subsequently declared unconstitutional." Baucum, 80 
F.3d at 341. In Chicot, the Supreme Court stated: 
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, 
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was 
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording 
no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that such broad 
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be 
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a 
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot 
justly be ignored. The past camiot always be erased by a new judicial 
declaration. 
Chicot, 308 S.Ct. at 374,60 S.Ct. at 318 (citations omitted); accord Baucum, 80 F.3d at 541 
(quoting the foregoing passage). Accordingly, the actual existence of a presumptively valid 
statute, prior to any determination finding otherwise, is an operative fact which the district 
court has power to entertain. 
Baucum also rejected the proposition "that the Blackledge/Menna exception to the 
general rule of waiver is about subject matter jurisdiction, since the [U.S. Supreme] Court 
has since clarified that a double jeopardy claim can, under certain circumstances, be waived 
voluntarily." Id. at 543 (emphasis in original) (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,9-10, 
107 S.Ct. 2680, 2685-86 (1987)). Baucum concluded that even if Blackledge and Menna 
address subject matter jurisdiction, "it does not follow that any facial constitutional challenge 
is also jurisdictional." Id. As explained above, such challenges are not jurisdictional. 
Finally, Baucum noted an "important prudential consideration[ ] that militate[s] in 
favor o f a conclusion that facial constitutional challenges be preserved or waived. Id. at 
544. The court explained that if it "were ... to treat all facial constitutional challenges as 
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jurisdictional, [it] would... invite' wait and see' tactics throughout the entire duration of the 
criminal proceedings." Id. Some courts have not required preservation because "[l]ittle 
purpose would be served by requiring a defendant to insist upon a trial in order to preserve 
his opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statute." Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 
864, 867 (1984). However, in Utah, such is not the case. "With approval of the court and 
the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and 
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 
a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion." Utah R. Civ. P. 
1 l(i). Defendants should not be permitted to plead guilty to a criminal offense, then after 
sentencing, appeal on the ground that the substantive crime for which they admitted guilt 
was unconstitutional. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 109 S.Ct at 762 
In support of its holding, the majority below also cites a number of federal circuits 
that treat an unconstitutional statute as a jurisdictional defect Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 6, 
(citing United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 
1065,123 S.Ct 2234 (2003); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hill, 564 
F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972); 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morgan, 230 
F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Palacios-
Casquete, 55 F.3d 557, 560-61 (11th Cir. 1995). These cases, however, are devoid of 
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analysis, offering no rationale for their conclusion. Instead, they appear to be simple 
applications of procedural rules of review. Such was clearly the case in the Second Circuit 
Court's decision inMercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F,2d 666, 671-72 (2nd Cir. 1974) (reaching 
the constitutional claim after concluding that under New York law, "no objection is required 
to preserve for appellate review a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right").7 
The majority also cites the Seventh Circuit. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 6 (citing 
United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v Kenney, 91 
F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495,496-97 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute, even though defendant had entered an unconditional guilty plea. Bell, 70 F.3d at 
497. However, that decision suggested that it would not do so in every case. See id.; accord 
Kenney, 91 F.3d at 885 n.l (observing that government expressly declined to raise a waiver 
argument but describing Bell as holding that "challenge to constitutionality of statute of 
conviction is, in certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea") 
(emphasis added).8 
7
 Morgan and Skinner cite Blackledge and Menna, but do not explain how Blackledge 
and Menna compel the conclusion that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a 
jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived by a guilty plea. For the reasons explained above, 
they do not. 
8
 The majority also cited the Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Barboa, 111 F.2d 
1420,1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985), in support of its holding. That decision, however, does not 
support the court of appeals holding. Bar boa permitted a defendant to challenge his guilty 
plea in a federal habeas proceeding based on a claim that the facts alleged did not constitute a 
crime. Barboa, 111 F.2d at 1423 n.3. 
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In sum, a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a statute is nonjurisdictional. 
Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any such challenge on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals holding that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived. 
Respectfully submitted May 16, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ p F F R E Y S. GRAY 
^-^Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
r i l - t i y 
AfluhivLV l i th t r tAL This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG i 2 2004 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020966-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 12, 2004) 
[2004 UT App 267 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
%1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to 
three counts of communications fraud, Richard Norris (Defendant) 
challenges the constitutionality of the underlying statute (the 
communications fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801 (2003).x We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1[2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications 
fraud and was bound over on all counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 (2003). After several days of trial, Defendant entered 
an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of third-
degree-felony communications fraud. See id. § 76-10-1801(1) (c) . 
After sentencing, and without moving to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting a 
1. Because the communications fraud statute has not changed 
since Defendant was charged, we cite to the most current version 
for convenience. 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
H3 We consider two issues on appeal. First, we must determine 
whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
Defendant's constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an 
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of 
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law, which we review for correctness . . . ." Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc. , 2001 UT 81,1)8, 31 P.3d 1147. Second, if this court 
has jurisdiction, then we must consider whether the 
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or 
vague on its face. "Constitutional challenges to statutes 
present questions of law, which we review for correctness." 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,1(5, 86 P.3d 735. "When 
addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute 
is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,1(6, 980 P.2d 191. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
1(4 "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . 
is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have 
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and 
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged 
pre-plea constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 
244,1Jl3, 54 P. 3d 645. The State asserts that Defendant's facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute falls within the ambit of the "pre-plea constitutional 
violations" mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278. Therefore, 
the State argues that because Defendant's challenge is 
nonjurisdictional in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea. 
Defendant asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id., 
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda admonitions 
and search warrants, and that a facial constitutional challenge 
to a statute is, at its heart, a jurisdictional issue. 
Therefore, Defendant argues that his challenge was not waived by 
his guilty plea. 
1|5 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of 
the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot 
proceed." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (per curiam). Subject matter jurisdiction "can 
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neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. 
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject 
matter may be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the 
right to make such an objection is never waived." James v. 
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and 
citations omitted). When subject matter jurisdiction is an 
issue, " [i]t is the duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not 
only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts 
in a cause under review.'" EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 
244 (1934)).2 
1[6 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional 
defects, but does not bar appeal of claims that the applicable 
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state 
an offense." United States v. Broncheauf 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.l 
(9th Cir. 1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all 
non[]jurisdictional defects and fact issues, a vagueness 
challenge is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, following a guilty 
plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted 
under an unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 25 
F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per 
curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does 
not waive a claim that--judged on its face--the charge is one 
which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge 
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did 
not preclude the defendant from raising his constitutional claims 
because they "went to the very power of the State to bring the 
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him"); 
2. Instead of focusing on whether subject matter jurisdiction 
exists in a particular context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases 
generally describing jurisdiction of our courts of general 
jurisdiction. The issue squarely presented in this case has not 
been addressed by Utah courts. 
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to the concept 
that a court with general jurisdiction over a particular claim 
may or may not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. 
Although not directly analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the 
best example involves claims against governmental entities. 
There is no question that courts of general jurisdiction in Utah 
have jurisdiction over those claims. This notwithstanding, 
however, Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly held that the 
failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements for 
claims against governmental entities deprives those courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., Greene 
v. Utah Transit Auth. , 2001 UT 109,^16-17, 37 P.3d 1156; 
Security Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,1(13, 47 P.3d 97. 
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(addressing defendant's claim that the underlying statute was 
unconstitutional because it "properly f [e]11 within the narrow 
scope of review not barred by a guilty plea"), cert, denied, 538 
U.S. 1065 (2003); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 
(8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is 
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not waived by 
a guilty plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's argument on appeal after his 
guilty plea because he made "the only argument available to him 
by asserting a jurisdictional challenge based on the 
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United States v. 
Kenney. 91 F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The defendant] 
entered his guilty plea without preserving his constitutional 
challenge[ to the underlying statute] for appeal. However, the 
government has expressly declined to raise a waiver argument, 
citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in 
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty 
plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's 
challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying statute 
after recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a 
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty plea"); 
United States v. Palacios-Casguete, 55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir. 
1995) ("A guilty plea . . . does not waive the right of an 
accused to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under 
which he is convicted."); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant "did not waive his 
constitutional attack on the [underlying] statute by pleading 
guilty"); United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 
1989) (stating that although the dividing line between 
constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty plea and those 
that survive the plea is not "crystal-clear," " [c]laims that 'the 
applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment 
fails to state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived 
by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 n.l)), 
amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Barboa, 
777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of guilty . . . 
does not bar a claim that the defendant may not constitutionally 
be convicted in the first instance . . . . If [the defendant] 
pie[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he is not 
now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes 
'to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court 
to answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting Blackledge, 
417 U.S. at 30)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (recognizing that "a guilty plea does not 
bar an appeal that asserts that . . . the charge is 
unconstitutional"); United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295 
n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that a claim based upon "the 
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the indictment" was 
9nnono^r /-»-* 
an "appealable issue [] following a . . . guilty plea"); United 
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(recognizing "that after entering . . . a plea of guilty, a 
defendant may only appeal jurisdictional defects in the 
proceeding below, such as . , . the unconstitutionality of the 
statute underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 
F.2d 666, 612 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea 
waives only nonjurisdictional defects and does not waive the 
right to contest the constitutionality of the statute that is the 
basis for a conviction." (second alteration in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464 
F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that "[a] defendant 
who has pleaded guilty is not barred from claiming . . . that the 
statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional" 
(quotations and citation omitted)); 1A Charles Alan Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed. 1999) 
("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not apply to 
constitutional claims that go 'to the very power of the State to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought 
against him.f A defendant who has pleaded guilty may still 
contend . . . that the statute under which he was charged is 
unconstitutional." (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
f7 Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute directly cuts to "the power and authority of the court to 
determine a controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is 
necessarily a jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an 
unconditional guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of a 
facial constitutional challenge to a statute, because such a 
challenge is jurisdictional in nature.3 Therefore, we address 
3. The justice court appeal process analog in Judge Bench's 
opinion is somewhat puzzling. 
Since justice courts are not courts of record, traditional 
appellate review is generally unavailable or severely limited. 
This notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution guarantees "the right 
to appeal in all [ criminal] cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
In City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), 
our supreme court ruled that the trial de novo appellate 
procedure now set out in Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 
(2002) satisfied this constitutional mandate. See Christensen, 
788 P.2d at 518-19. Following a trial de novo, traditional 
appeal therefrom is available only if "the district court rules 
on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-120 (7) . 
In our view, this unique process for obtaining review of 
justice court proceedings has nothing to do with issue 
(continued...) 
Defendant's arguments.4 
II. Constitutional Challenge 
^8 Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 (2003) . We consider each of his arguments in turn. 
A. Overbreadth 
1[9 "In considering whether a statute [is overbroad], a court's 
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." In re 
I .M.L. , 2002 UT 110,1115, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations 
omitted). We examine "criminal statutes . . . with particular 
care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid 
even if they also have legitimate application." Id. (quotations 
and citations omitted). However, n[o]nly a statute that is 
substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of 
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987). Overbreadth "must not 
only be real, but substantial as well." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 
U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quotations and citation omitted). 
3. (...continued) 
preservation or waiver of nonjurisdictional constitutional claims 
by voluntary guilty plea--section 78-5-120 makes no reference to 
either. Indeed, if anything, it is a recognition of the 
importance of claims involving the constitutionality of statutes 
or ordinances, specifically contemplating such challenges in the 
court of record in the first appeal. Under the statutory scheme, 
raising the constitutional challenge to the statute or ordinance 
is the method by which jurisdiction is conferred on appellate 
courts to entertain further appeals, the defendant having already 
been accorded his or her constitutional right of appeal from the 
justice court by trial de novo in a court of record. This is a 
far cry from the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction 
in an initial appeal of right. 
4. The State argues that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4, both addresses and disposes of the issues herein. 
The appellant's claims in Myers were based upon the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, see id. at %10j and, to the extent the 
appellant alluded to constitutional defects in a statute, his 
challenge was not facial. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court 
characterized his argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect 
legal interpretation [of a rule of law]," and never addressed or 
ruled upon the effect of a facial constitutional challenge. Id. 
at 1l7. 
UlO When interpreting the challenged language, "we look to the 
statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used 
each term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at <fl6. 
"Statutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both 
harmful and innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 
P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citations 
omitted). The communications fraud statute prohibits 
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, 
property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and . . . communicat[ing] directly 
or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing 
the scheme or artifice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits that the 
communications fraud statute is overbroad "because it permits 
criminal prosecution and sanctions in every case involving a 
communication [] that could be construed as dishonest." 
Specifically, Defendant argues that the communications fraud 
statute does not require an intent to defraud, and that it 
criminalizes innocuous behavior because " [a]s long as there is an 
artifice, a false communication in any form made for the purpose 
of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of 
value, the elements of the communications fraud statute are met." 
Defendant also alleges that the modes of communications 
prohibited in the communications fraud statute are similarly 
overbroad and prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. See 
id. § 76-10-1801(6). We disagree. 
^11 First, the communications fraud statute does not prohibit 
all false "pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions," only those where an individual seeks "to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of 
value." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Second, it requires proof that~the 
false or fraudulent "pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth." Id. § 76-10-1801(7). While the First Amendment may 
value some falsehoods for their contribution to public debate, 
see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 
(1964), it has not given protection to malicious statements that 
were made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless 
disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Id. at 279-80. 
The communications fraud statute draws the distinction between 
criminal and innocent behavior with a similar mens rea, and thus, 
it cannot be said that it is "substantially overbroad" and should 
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be "invalidated on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the communications fraud statute is 
not overbroad on its face. 
B. Vagueness 
Kl2 Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally vague in its use of the terms "artifice," 
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1), (6)(a). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that 
a statute or ordinance define an offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations 
and citations omitted). However, because the communications 
fraud statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," 
Defendant must show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Village of Hoffmann Estates v. Flipside, Hoffmann 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). 
%13 Defendant argues that the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(1), is defined too broadly and would encompass any 
form of deceit so that ordinary persons would not know whether 
the deceit was prohibited. While not defined in the 
communications fraud statute, "artifice" is commonly understood 
to mean "an artful stratagem," or a "trick." Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed. 1986). Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "artifice" similarly as " [a] clever plan or idea, 
esp[ecially] one intended to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 
108 (7th ed. 1999) . Additionally, we do not read the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a vacuum, but 
rather as it relates to the other terms within the communications 
fraud statute. See Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,^8, 502 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (stating that " [s]ubsections of a statute should not 
be construed in a vacuum but must be read as part of the statute 
as a whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted)). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the 
communications fraud statute does not prohibit all artful 
stratagems and tricks, only those meant to, inter alia, defraud 
others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague because it is broad." State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). We conclude that the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with 
"sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 
1265 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude 
that the term "artifice," as used in the communications fraud 
statute, is not unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801(1). 
?nri9na££-r<7\ 
fl4 Defendant next argues that the term "communicate," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the 
broadest possible definition" under the communications fraud 
statute. The communications fraud statute prohibits 
"communicat[ing] directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it specifically 
states that to communicate "means to bestow, convey, make known, 
recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or 
to transmit information." Id. § 76-10-1801(6) (a) . Defendant's 
argument is unavailing. Although "communicate," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(6)(a), is broadly defined, this does not necessarily 
make the term unconstitutionally vague. See Wareham, 772 P.2d at 
966. Indeed, uhe communications fraud statute does not seek to 
punish those who keep an artifice or scheme to themselves. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate how "ordinary people can[not] 
understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails to 
demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in the 
communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (6) (a) . 
1|l5 Finally, Defendant argues that the phrase "anything of 
value," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally 
vague because it is undefined and left open to a variety of 
interpretations. Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical 
situations in an attempt to illustrate the vagueness of the 
phrase "anything of value." Id. However, "speculation about 
possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the 
[c]ourt will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is 
surely valid in the vast majority of its intended applications." 
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (quotations and 
citation omitted). Defendant was charged under the 
communications fraud statute because he devised a scheme to 
defraud others of "money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We 
believe that "the vast majority of [the communications fraud 
statute's] intended applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733 
(quotations and citations omitted), will involve incidents where 
individuals have defrauded others of "money" or "property," Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), both of which are terms that are 
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to determine 
what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265. 
Additionally, because Defendant was charged with devising a 
scheme to defraud others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1), his actions do not fall within the "anything of value" 
realm, id., and thus, he may not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague. See Village of Hoffmann Estates, 455 
U.S. at 495 n.7 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies 
may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). 
fl6 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the communications 
fraud statute fails. We conclude that the communications fraud 
statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad, nor 
unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
1fl7 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we conclude that 
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute is not barred by his voluntary, 
unconditional guilty plea. However, in considering Defendant's 
facial challenge to the communications fraud statute on 
overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we conclude that it is not 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Accordingly, we affirm 
Defendant^s\ conviction. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
i[l8 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately to 
explain my position, because I recognize the lead opinion 
represents a departure from the general prohibition against 
raising issues for the first time on appeal, especially in the 
face of a guilty plea. 
fl9 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject matter 
jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by either party or 
the court at any time. So far as I am aware, there is no 
exception to this rule for guilty pleas. See James v. Galetka, 
965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[Subject matter 
jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can neither be waived 
nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the 
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged at 
any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an 
5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states that "[a] rguably, 
this is precisely the type of conduct the communications fraud 
statute was intended to prohibit." 
& 
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objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
112 0 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to sovereign 
immunity cases is actually pretty good. If a plaintiff sued the 
State without giving the required presuit notice, and the State 
did not raise the lack of notice as a defense below, it would 
presumably not be permitted to raise the lack of notice for the 
first time on appeal in challenging a judgment that had been 
entered against it. However, if giving the presuit notice is 
necessary to vest the court with subject matter jurisdiction, 
then of course the lack of notice could be raised for the first 
time on appeal. And indeed, giving presuit notice strictly in 
compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has been held to 
be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.. Greene v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,^16, 37 P.3d 1156. 
1(21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction issue usually 
arises in civil cases, the concept is the same in criminal cases. 
If a guilty plea is entered, and no issues are reserved for 
appeal consistent with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), then unless the guilty plea is set aside as 
involuntary, all issues are waived on appeal, except subject 
matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived. See James, 965 
P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was charged with 
murder in juvenile court and pled guilty, on appeal to this court 
he most certainly could challenge the lack of the juvenile 
court's subject matter jurisdiction over an adult charged with 
murder, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105 (Supp. 2003)--even 
if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he never raised the 
jurisdictional problem below. The same is true if a defendant 
pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no such criminal 
offense were on the books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and did 
not raise below the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he 
still could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the 
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
And obviously he would succeed. The trial court simply would 
lack the judicial power to convict the defendant of a nonexistent 
crime. 
i]22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: Suppose our 
criminal code made it a felony to commit the crime of blasphemy, 
defined as "disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning His 
existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not 
preserve a constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and 
did not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he raise 
for the first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality, 
under the First Amendment, of the statute criminalizing 
blasphemy? At one level, it seems that charges brought pursuant 
to such a statute would be just as much a nullity as charges 
brought, as in the immediately preceding hypothetical, in the 
complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In simplest terms, in 
this country there simply could be no crime of blasphemy--any 
statute purporting to provide otherwise would be facially 
unconstitutional. But he could not raise this constitutional 
challenge for the first time on appeal unless facial 
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction.1 Does 
it? I am not completely sure, although I can see that, in 
concept, an unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no 
statute. 
112 3 This is what ultimately explains my vote in this case: No 
Utah appellate court has squarely answered the question of 
whether a challenge to a criminal statute based on facial 
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction. The 
lead opinion cites a multitude of cases that have held it does; 
Judge Bench's opinion cites no^case that has addressed the 
question and held it does not.2 It is admittedly somewhat 
1. Judge Bench points out such an argument could be reached 
under the plain error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue 
opportunity provided by the plain error doctrine is rather 
limited. As hereafter shown, the ability to claim plain error 
can itself be waived. In contrast, subject matter jurisdiction 
can never be waived. In the blasphemy hypothetical, if facial 
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, 
it could be addressed for the first time on appeal even if plain 
error was not raised, see State v. All Real Property, 2 004 UT App 
232,i|l3 n.7; was inadequately raised, see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of the 
requirements for plain error are not met, "plain error is not 
established" and cannot be raised); or was raised too late. See 
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,119, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court 
would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine 
because plain error raised for first time in reply brief). 
2. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 
UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, considered this question and 
rejected it on the merits. The Myers court described the 
jurisdictional argument asserted in the case as being "somewhat 
convoluted." Id. at ^15. Later, the Court characterized the 
argument as being tantamount to a "claim[] that the trial court's 
decision constituted an 'erroneous application of the law.'" Id. 
at %11 (citation omitted). In any event, the Court's dismissal 
of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was premised on the 
simplistic notion that "'[a] court has subject matter 
(continued...) 
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counterintuitive for me that a substantive conclusion of 
unconstitutionality--even facial unconstitutionality--defeats 
subject matter jurisdiction, but that seems to be the prevailing 
view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur in the 
court' s ojs 
£l3?£gory K. Or me, Judge 
2 . ( . . .continued) 
jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court 
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute 
from which the court derives its authority,'" id. at ^16 
(citation omitted)--an obvious overstatement as readily shown by 
the sovereign immunity example, i.e., district courts have 
general civil jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over disputes 
against the State, but lack subject matter jurisdiction over such 
a case if the presuit notice is flawed in some way. Another 
example of the overbreadth of the pronouncement in Myers is the 
fact that appellate courts have the constitutional and statutory 
power to consider appeals, and yet are held to lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over appeals that are untimely. See Utah 
Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided 
by statute . . . . " ) ; id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2) (specifying 
appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc. 
v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[F]ailure 
to file an appeal within the required time limit deprived the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v. 
Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)). 
The very best indication that the Myers court simply did not 
have before it the issue we must decide--at least not in any kind 
of cogent, well-developed way--is that the only authority cited 
in Myers is two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
statute giving the district courts original jurisdiction of "all 
matters civil and criminal," subject to certain limitations. 
Myers, 2003 UT 31 at Ul6 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) 
(2002)) . The Myers opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it 
treat, the extensive state and federal jurisprudence categorizing 
the facial unconstitutionality of a criminal statute as being a 
matter of subject matter jurisdiction—a virtual impossibility if 
the argument had actually been made and was well-supported, as in 
the instant case. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result): 
1J24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main opinion's 
analysis of the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). But, because 
of the procedural posture of this case, I would rule that we 
cannot reach the issue under controlling Utah law.1 
^25 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant entered an 
unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications 
fraud. CJL. State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(allowing defendants to enter conditional pleas preserving the 
right to appeal any specified pretrial ruling). In the district 
court, Defendant never challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute. Nor did he enter a conditional plea to preserve his 
right to appeal the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute. See id. Furthermore, Defendant never filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40 
P.3d 63 0 (requiring defendant to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea before 
defendant can challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a notice of appeal directly 
from his sentence. Now, for the first time, Defendant attempts 
to raise the issues of overbreadth and vagueness as 
constitutional challenges to the communications fraud statute. 
He claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
be waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
convict him of violating an unconstitutional statute. 
[^26 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding of 
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court recently explained subject 
matter jurisdiction very succinctly as follows: "A court has 
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of 
cases the court has been empowered to entertain by the 
constitution or statute from which the court derives its 
authority." Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,1(16, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
(other quotations and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City 
v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter 
1. Given the clarity of the Utah law, decisions from the federal 
courts are not helpful. Nor are the federal cases even 
consistent with each other. See, e.g., United States v. 
Montilia. 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) amended by 907 F.2d 
115 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The dividing line between the majority of 
constitutional claims waived by a voluntary plea of guilty, and 
those that challenge the right of the state to hale the defendant 
into court, and thus survive the plea . . . , has not been 
crystal-clear."). 
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jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency of the court to 
decide the case.'" (citations omitted)). 
1(27 The main opinion contends that a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute is necessarily a jurisdictional 
matter because the inherent constitutionality of a statute 
affects whether a court has the power and authority to decide the 
issue. However, without a proper challenge, courts must presume 
the constitutionality of a statute. 
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional 
until the contrary is clearly shown. It is 
only when statutes manifestly infringe upon 
some constitutional provision that they can 
be declared void. Every reasonable 
presumption must be indulged in and every 
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. 
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,1(10, P.3d 
(quotations and citations omitted). Thus, because the 
communications fraud statute was not challenged below, it is 
presumed to be constitutional, and the district court had 
jurisdiction. 
f28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my colleagues attempt 
to find support for their extraordinary decision by pointing to 
the distinction between general jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not focus "on 
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in [this] particular 
context" because, unlike claims made against governmental 
entities--which require compliance with the Immunity Act--the 
communications fraud statute at issue here requires that nothing 
be done, by either party, before criminal defendants can be 
prosecuted and courts can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. 
With claims against a governmental entity, "the legislature has 
explicitly declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must 
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or her right 
to maintain an action against a governmental entity." Greene v. 
Utah Transit Auth. , 2001 UT 109,1115, 37 P.3d 1156. Thus, 
11
 [c] ompliance with the Immunity Act is necessary to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims 
against governmental entities." Id. at 1[l6. In the instant 
case, as with presumably every other criminal prosecution, the 
charging statute does not explicitly declare what must be done 
before subject matter jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the 
district court had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter 
jurisdiction due to an absence of legislative requirements or 
limitations.2 
f29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to challenge the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, he had to 
do so first in the district court. See, e .cr. , State v. Pugmire, 
898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Although [defendant] 
2. In an attempt to bolster the "main opinion's reasoning, the 
concurring opinion discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals. 
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with murder in 
juvenile court. Thankfully, this potential calamity has already 
been resolved by our legislature. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-
104, -105(1) (a) (2002) (detailing jurisdiction of juvenile 
courts). By contrast, our legislature has not limited the 
jurisdiction of district courts in a similar manner. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The district court has original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Second, the 
criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the nonexistent crime of 
blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy existed, then we would 
not indulge in the presumption that a nonexistent, unwritten 
statute was constitutional. Here, however, a statute does exist, 
and, until challenged, we must presume it to be constitutional. 
Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the theoretical crime of 
blasphemy, and did not preserve his constitutional challenge, 
then he could raise the challenge for the first time on appeal by 
arguing plain error. A plain error challenge could easily be 
made without making the facial constitutionality of a statute a 
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. 
As for the concurring opinion's statement that " [n] o Utah 
appellate court has squarely answered the question of whether a 
challenge based on facial unconstitutionality goes to subject 
matter jurisdiction," our supreme court has squarely addressed 
the question. In Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 
4, the Utah Supreme Court; explained that even when Myers argued, 
for the first time on appeal, that the wholly and facially 
unconstitutional aggravated murder statute divested the trial 
court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to state any legitimate 
jurisdictional defect" because "[t]he Utah Code provides that 
'the district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law.'" Id. at 1lS (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-
4(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus, even when Norris 
argues, for the first time on appeal, that the communications 
fraud statute is facially unconstitutional, and that such 
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the district court, he fails "to state any legitimate 
jurisdictional defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at Kl6. 
onnon^/-^-
raises the issue on appeal, he did not challenge the 
constitutionality of this statutory scheme before the trial 
court. As a general rule, we will not consider issues--including 
constitutional issues—initially raised on appeal."); State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As the Utah 
appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally will 
not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the 
appellant raises on appeal for the first time."). 
[^30 This rule applies with equal force to facial challenges to a 
statute made for the first time on appeal. In State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), when a facial 
challenge to a criminal statute was raised for the first time on 
appeal, this court addressed Archambeaufs challenge only for the 
"plain error" and "exceptional circumstances" arguments he made. 
See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant, in the instant 
appeal, asserts no claim of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. 
[^31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional challenges for 
the first time on appeal will logically necessitate overruling a 
large body of jurisdictional jurisprudence involving Utah's 
justice courts. .See, e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 517 (Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly 
held that a person dissatisfied with a justice court decision 
could appeal that decision to a district court and that the 
district court decision was final unless the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on appeal, but 
in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2 0 03 UT App 312,^2, 
78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) ("'The decision of the district court 
[from a hearing de novo following a justice court's ruling] is 
final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on 
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.'" (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 
2002 UT App 405,1(6, 61 P. 3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides 
that neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from proceedings in the district 
court held pursuant to an appeal from the justice court unless 
the issues raised in the justice court involve [] the validity or 
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." (quotations and 
citations omitted)); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[H]istorically, Utah appellate courts have 
never had jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court 
decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an unfavorable 
justice court judgment, absent the raising of a constitutional 
challenge in the justice court."). The practical consequence of 
the main opinion is that defendants will now be allowed to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this court, for 
the first time, without ever having bothered to raise the issue 
in either justice or district court. 
|^32 Having failed below to challenge the statute on grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness, and having failed on appeal to argue 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now 
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm based on 
Defendant's failure to preserve his constitutional challenge. 
& JL 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
